

Harnessing the Power of Visualization for Industrial Control Systems

Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group
Alan A. Hendricks, CISSP, CISM

Emily Frye

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We Will Cover

- Nutshell Summary of Cybersecurity in Critical Infrastructure
- Approaches to Date and Current Model
 - Case Study: TSA SOC
- Leap in thinking
- Next-Generation Cybersecurity for CI and ICS: Visualization
 - Case Study: FAA
- Comparative Analysis



How We Got Here

- Individual operations of entities across most sectors
- Concept of CI sector
 - 1996 PCCIP
 - Early ISACs/PCIS: legacy of physical and cyber separation
- 9/11/2001 reinvigorated CI effort
- Situational awareness capability in physical
- Situational awareness capability for cyber evolves:
 - Entity SOC → Function-Wide SOC → Sector SOC



What Kinds of SOC Apply in ICS?

- Security Operations Center that covers all networks that support a given Function, Entity, or both
 - Function: flow of oil in a pipeline (classic ICS)
 - Entity: Chemical plant
 - Scaling up: State (Virginia, Alabama, California) or Sector:
 Energy
 - Or some mix of these: comprehensive system monitoring across many or all functions and networks within a given environment



Function/Sector SOC: An Example

- Function-wide SOCs provide the best situational awareness for cyber (that we know of)
- Some sectors are aware of the need and have moved to establish a (function-wide) sector-wide SOC:
 - The TSA Example



TSA SOC Overview

Key objectives:

- Partner with TSA to <u>independently</u> monitor their IT enterprise by detecting, analyzing and coordinating the response to cyber attacks
- Serve as an <u>independent</u> security advocate for engineering future TSA IT infrastructure solution
- Assess emerging security threats
- Approach to accomplishing objectives:
 - Provide a fully outsourced 24x7x365 SOC solution that leverages robust physical and technology platforms with proven SOC operations best practices
 - Provide a security engineering cadre and a research/evaluation environment to evaluate and provide feedback on potential IT solutions, as well as emerging security technologies and techniques




Objectives

- Review and evaluate the configurations of the security devices and recommends changes to remediate deficiencies
- Verify and validate any suspected security events, including breaches, intrusions, policy violations, and attacks against TSA
- Coordinate and support response to security events and incidents
- Analyze TSA IT infrastructure vulnerability scans, assess vulnerabilities and risks, recommend actions, and monitor progress and compliance against plan of action and milestones (POA&Ms)
- Monitor the IT industry and advise on emerging security technologies, architectures, methods, and practices
- Evaluate the TSA IT security infrastructure and IT security operations, and recommend improvements in security technologies, methods, process, and procedures



SOC Architecture








Portal View - Threats






Portal View - Service Requests





Portal View - Trending







Entical Infrastructure Physical Side ... Leap Forward

- Burst of activity around Visualization capabilities
 - Google Earth started a whole new appreciation for the maturity of visualization technologies
 - Recent application in Homeland Security/Critical Infrastructure has moved to emergency-service support
 - VIPER/Virtual Alabama → VUSA Project are good examples
- 2009 issuance of 20 Critical Controls
 - If visualization offers great promise on the physical side, could it work on the cyber side too?












Visualization for CI - ICS Networks: What Could We See?

- Live Network Graph with customizable centricity
- 3D Geospatial View
- Zoomable/Pannable IPV4 Map
- PortFlow Display
- Ontology Viewer/Editor
- Rule Viewer
- Alert Viewer
- Annotation Viewer
- System Display
- Cluster Display
- Search Dialog



What Does This Look Like?







Summary: Compare and Contrast

Traditional SOC	Visualization-Enabled SOC
Low stakeholder buy-in required	Stakeholder acceptance important for optimizing function
Moderate-risk environment (Small Business Administration; lower-impact networks)	Moderate-high risk environment (Critical Infrastructures, ICS, known targets)
Quick implementation (based upon reporting-only paradigm – 1 B security events/month)	Less-rapid implementation
Summary Reporting and Analytics	System-Wide Awareness/Broad- Scale/System-of-Systems



Questions and Discussion



Contact Information/Feedback

Emily Frye

Emily_Frye@sra.com / 703-284-6645

Alan Hendricks

Alan_Hendricks@sra.com / 703-886-9255



